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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of nancially
integrated multinational rms. Under the assumption that multinational rms at least partly use
internal loans to nance foreign investment, we nd that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive
from the perspective of a small, open economy. This nding contrasts the standard result that
the optimal source based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, to the extent that multinational rms
nance investment in country i with loans from a¢ liates in country j, the burden of corporate
taxes in the latter country partly fall on investment and thus workers in the former country. This
tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard
models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational rms
thus represents a way to resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes
and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.
Keywords : Corporate taxation, Tax exporting, Multinational rms, Internal capital markets,
1 Introduction
Multinational rms account for a large and increasing share of world output and have been the object
of much recent research. Key insights concern the multiple purposes served by internal capital markets.
Firstly, several papers demonstrate that internal capital markets may substitute for dysfunctional exter-
nal capital markets. For instance, there is evidence that multinational rms extend more internal loans
to foreign a¢ liates in countries with weak creditor rights where the cost of external loans is higher (Desai
et al., 2004). Also, it has been shown that internal capital markets allow a¢ liates of foreign multina-
tionals to expand in the aftermath of currency crises where local rms are constrained by scarce external
nancing (Desai et al. 2007). Secondly, a series of papers point to the role of internal capital markets as a
prot shifting instrument. Specically, it has been shown that multinational rms provide more internal
loans and less equity to foreign a¢ liates when the corporate tax rate facing the foreign a¢ liate is high
(Desai et al., 2004; Buettner et al., 2009). Finally, it has been argued that internal capital markets serve
to mitigate disadvantages associated with the multinational organizational form. For instance, there is
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evidence that protable foreign a¢ liates of US multinationals provide capital directly to other foreign
a¢ liates, which allows for a deferral of the US tax on repatriations to the parent company (Altshuler
and Grubert, 2002).
Importantly, internal capital markets give rise to nancial linkages within the multinational rm in
the sense that the di¤erent entities of the rm are tied together by internal loans and equity stakes. A
detailed dataset on German inbound and outbound foreign direct investment collected by the German
Central Bank provides a rare opportunity to assess the nature and size of these nancial linkages. For
a sample of German multinational rms, Buettner and Wamser (2009) report an average internal debt-
asset ratioof foreign a¢ liates of around 25%. Roughly half of the internal loans was granted by German
parent companies whereas the remaining half was provided by other foreign a¢ liates. As shown in the
next section, these gures are largely consistent with available data on the capital structure of US and
other multinationals.
This paper develops a model of capital taxation in the presence of nancially integrated multinational
rms. The model makes two key assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that multinational rms at least
partly use internal loans to nance foreign investment. This assumption is in line with the empirical
evidence on the capital structure of multinational rms, which suggests that internal loans typically
nance 25-30% of the assets of foreign a¢ liates. Secondly, it is assumed that internal loans serve other
purposes than prot shifting. This assumption is consistent with the empirical literature on internal
capital markets, which identies several important motives for internal nancing unrelated to prot
shifting. It is also supported by the fact that German parent companies provide foreign a¢ liates with
a substantial amount of internal loans. As noted by Buettner and Wamser (2009), these loans cannot
be rationalized within a prot shifting framework since the German corporate tax rate is very high by
international standards.
The main nding of the paper is that internal loans introduce a tax exporting mechanism that causes
the optimal corporate tax rate to be positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This
contrasts the standard result that the optimal source based capital tax is zero (Gordon, 1986). In the
standard model with only domestic rms, small, open economies are facing a perfectly elastic supply of
capital, hence the entire burden of capital taxes is shifted to domestic workers. By distorting the labor
supply to the same extent as labor taxes and adding a distortion of the capital-labor ratio, capital taxes
are thus strictly dominated by labor taxes. In our model, multinational rms operate in two countries
A and B and partly nance a¢ liates in country A with internal loans from a¢ liates in country B. As in
the standard model, taxes raising the cost of investment in country A are fully shifted to workers in this
country. However, under the usual rules of corporate taxation with full deduction for interest expenses
and full taxation of interest income, the internal loans shift tax base from country A to country B and
the e¤ective tax rate on investment in country A is thus partly determined by the corporate tax rate in
country B. Hence, by raising the e¤ective tax rate on capital in country A, corporate taxes in country
B are partly exported to workers in country A. This provides a motive for using capital taxes in country
B, which is absent in the standard model.
2
Our nding may be reconciled with the standard result that the optimal source based capital tax
is zero by noting that in the presence of intra-rm nancial linkages the corporate tax is no longer a
pure source tax. Since investment is partly nanced with internal loans from entities located in other
countries, the tax base generated by investment in any given jurisdiction is e¤ectively shared between
several jurisdictions.
By accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational rms, our model resolves the tension
between the standard result that the optimal source based capital tax is zero and the casual empirical
observation that most countries employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates. A number of alternative
explanations have been put forward to explain the fact that countries raise considerable revenue with
source based capital taxes. Wildasin (2003) shows that under imperfect capital mobility, optimal capital
taxes are positive and inversely related to the speed with which the capital stock adjusts in response
to changes in the local return to capital. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994) argue that income shifting
between di¤erent tax bases introduces a scope for using a capital income tax since the latter works as a
back-stop for the personal income tax. Gordon and Varian (1989) show that country-specic productivity
shocks resurrect the case for positive capital taxes because the desire of foreign investors to hedge risk
implies that the demand for domestic capital is imperfectly elastic with respect to the net-of-tax return.
A few existing papers analyze capital taxation in the presence of nancially integrated multinational
rms while focusing exclusively on nancial strategies that allow multinational rms to shift corporate tax
base between jurisdictions. Huizinga et al. (2008) present a model of debt shifting where multinational
rms - like domestic rms - choose the optimal leverage by trading o¤ agency costs against tax benets
but - unlike domestic rms - are able to allocate more debt to subsidiaries facing high corporate tax
rates. Other papers develop models of prot shifting where internal loans from a¢ liates in tax havens to
other a¢ liates reduce the global tax liabilities of the multinational rm (Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005;
Johannesen, 2010). Generally, tax motivated nancial strategies like debt shifting and prot shifting
tend to increase the tax sensitivity of capital tax bases and reinforce the race-to-the-bottom in capital
tax rates. The present paper shows that the use of non-tax motivated nancial strategies may generate
just the opposite result.
Finally, the tax exporting mechanism, which is at the heart of the model, relates our work to Huizinga
and Nielsen (1997). The key assumptions of the latter paper are foreign ownership of rms and existence
of pure economic rents. Under these assumptions, taxes on the normal return to capital are partly shifted
to foreign owners of domestic rms through a reduction in rents. Clearly, this is akin to our model where
capital taxes are partly shifted to foreign workers through a reduction in foreign wages.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the use of internal loans
within multinational rms. Section 3 develops a model of optimal capital taxation in the presence
of nancially integrated multinational rms. Section 4 presents an extended model with endogenous
nancial structure. Section 5 presents a crude empirical test of the model. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The use of internal loans by multinational rms
Internal loans play a crucial a role in our model. This section therefore provides a thorough discussion
of the use of loans within multinational rms. Firstly, we briey review existing empirical evidence on
the size and structure of internal loans. Secondly, we o¤er some explanations for the apparent puzzle
that rms in many cases resort to internal loans although equity investments would be more favorable
from a corporate tax perspective.
The leading empirical evidence on the capital structure of multinational rms is summarized in Table
1. The MiDi dataset collected by the German Central Bank is a unique data source containing very
detailed nancial information on virtually all German inbound and outbound foreign direct investment
since 1996. Two recent papers provide summary statistics from this dataset. Buettner and Wamser
(2009) report an average internal debt-asset ratioof foreign a¢ liates of German rms of around 24%.
The internal debt-asset ratiois decomposed into a parent debt-asset ratioof 13% and an other a¢ liate
debt-asset ratioof 11%. Ramb and Weichenreider (2005) report an average internal debt-asset ratio
of German a¢ liates of non-German rms of around 29%. Two papers provide evidence on the use of
parent debt by US multinational rms using two distinct data sources. Altshuler and Grubert (2002)
report an average parent debt-asset ratioof foreign a¢ liates of around 11% based on data collected by
the US Internal Revenue Service. Desai et al. (2004) report a slightly lower average parent debt-asset
ratio of around 9% drawing on a dataset from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The US data
sources do not distinguish between loans from other a¢ liates than the parent company and loans from
third parties and, hence, do not contain su¢ cient information to compute the total internal debt-asset
ratioof foreign a¢ liates.
This empirical evidence lends strong support to the two key assumptions of the theoretical model to
be developed in the next section. Firstly, the model assumes that internal loans play a signicant role
in nancing cross-border investment. The two papers reporting average internal debt-asset ratioson
the basis of microdata nd that internal loans account for as much as 25-30% of the nancing of foreign
a¢ liates.1 Secondly, the model assumes that internal loans are not exclusively motivated by prot shifting
in the sense that even if the corporate tax rate in country i is (moderately) higher than the corporate tax
rate in country j, some entities in country j receive loans from a¢ liates in country i. This assumption is
clearly consistent with the empirical evidence since parent companies in both Germany and the US are
important providers of internal loans to foreign a¢ liates despite the relatively high corporate tax rates
in these countries.2
1This nding is also consistent with macrodata. In the sectoral breakdown of national accounts, the external loans
of multinational rms generally appear as interest expenses in the non-nancial corporate sector whereas internal loans
appear both as interest income and interest expenses. According to Eurostat, the interest income and interest expenses
of non-nancial corporations resident in the EU amounted to e280 billion and e470 billion respectively in 2007. The fact
that interest income amounts to almost 60% of interest expenses is suggestive of an important role for internal loans.
2Another nding indicating that internal loans serve other purposes than prot shifting is due to Gopalan et al. (2007)
who document large ows of internal loans within Indian business groups. Clearly, such ows do not have a prot shifting
motive since the borrowing and lending entities face the same corporate tax rate.
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While the German and US data provide strong evidence that rms use internal loans for other
purposes than prot shifting and this nding is consistent with the literature on internal capital markets
stressing the non-tax motives for intra-rm capital ows, the prevalence of internal loans from parent
companies in high-tax countries to a¢ liates in low-tax countries represents a puzzle in the sense that
internal loans are dominated by equity investments from a corporate tax perspective. Loans from a
parent company in a high-tax country to an a¢ liate in a low-tax country transfers taxable prots from
the low-tax to the high-tax country. Alternatively, the parent company could provide funds in the form
of equity, in which case the full investment return would be subject to corporate taxation in the low-tax
country. It is not immediately clear why rms in many cases choose the mode of nancing associated with
the larger corporate tax burden. In the remainder of this section, we explore a number of explanations
for this puzzle.
Chowdry and Coval (1998) present an explicit treatment of the choice between internal debt and
equity within multinational rms. The paper models a parent company nancing a foreign subsidiary
with either internal debt or equity in an environment with uncertainty about future earnings. The main
nding is that under a typical corporate tax system with imperfect carry-forward of tax losses, the
optimal capital structure involves a mix of internal debt and equity. Intuitively, the possibility that the
parent company will be loss-making in future periods introduces an incentive to use debt nancing even
when the parent company faces a higher corporate tax rate than the subsidiary since interest income
at the level of the parent company in some states of the world are shielded by losses. Similarly, the
possibility that the subsidiary will be loss-making in future periods limits the incentive to use debt
nancing even when the parent company faces a lower corporate tax rate than the subsidiary since
interest expenses at the level of the subsidiary in some states of the world do not shield prots.
Another strand of literature that may shed light on the choice between internal debt and equity
focuses on the principal-agent problems inherent to the corporate organizational form where managers
(agents) conduct business on behalf of shareholders (principals). Jensen (1986) argues that if managers
are self-interested and tend to engage in empire building, debt may increase e¢ ciency by reducing the
free cash ow available for unprotable investment. While the original formulation of the theory is
concerned with the merits of external loans, a similar reasoning may arguably be applied to internal
loans. Within the multinational rm, local managers of foreign subsidiaries (agents) conduct business
on behalf of the central management of the rm (principal). Assuming that local managers tend to be
concerned with the growth of the specic subsidiary that they operate whereas the objectives of the
central management relate to the performance of the entire rm, nancing in the form of internal loans
represent an instrument to prevent excessive growth in subsidiaries with a large cash ow. Moreover,
interest payments specied ex ante in a loan agreement are arguably a superior means to achieve this
end than dividend payments decided ex post on the basis of available accounting prots, the size of which
is at least partly controlled by the local management.
Less theoretically founded but nevertheless potentially important explanations for the prevalence of
internal loans revolve around the fact that loans constitute a exible and cost e¢ cient way to transfer
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funds within the rm.
Firstly, from a corporate law perspective, debt is a much more exible nancial instrument than
equity. When a parent company injects capital into a subsidiary in the form of equity, a number of
formal requirements must be observed. The legal details vary across countries, however, typically a
decision to issue new shares must be adopted by the general assembly or the board of directors of the
subsidiary, the decision needs the attestation of a notary public, the statutes of the subsidiary must be
modied to reect the higher share capital of the rm and the new statutes of the rm must be published
in the o¢ cial gazette. Similarly, repatriation of prots in the form of dividends is subject to a number
of legal requirements and restrictions. The decision to pay dividends must be adopted by the general
assembly or the board of directors, interim accounts need to be drawn up and approved by an external
auditor unless the distribution coincides with the closing of the annual accounts and dividends cannot be
paid out of capital, reserves or unrealized prots. By comparison, debt nance is very straightforward.
Essentially, the transfer of funds from one a¢ liate to another in the form of a loan merely requires that
the managers of the two entities conclude a loan agreement, which also species the size and timing of
the interest payments.
Secondly, other taxes than the corporate tax may inuence the choice between nancing with equity
or internal loans. A number of countries levy capital duties, which are taxes on the transfer of capital
to corporations in the form of equity. Currently, seven EU member states levy capital duties at rates
ranging from 0.5% to 1% and similar taxes have only recently been abolished in a number of other EU
countries.3 Capital transfers in the form of loans are not subject to capital duty, which constitutes a
clear advantage of internal debt nancing over equity nancing. Also, cross-border dividends and interest
payments may be subject to withholding taxes at di¤erential rates. Although withholding taxes in the
source country can often be credited against tax liabilities in the residence country, there are a number
of instances where withholding taxes a¤ect the level of e¤ective taxation and thus inuence the choice
between equity or internal loans.4
Finally, when rms are organized with chains of ownership, as is often the case with large multi-
national rms, the two above mentioned disadvantages of equity nancing are exacerbated. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the holding structure of a stylized multinational rm. The rm
wishes to transfer funds from the protable subsidiary E to the cash-strapped subsidiary F. To complete
the transfer without the use of internal loans and without changes in the holding structure, funds need
to pass along existing ownership chains, that is as dividend payments from E to C, from C to A and from
A to P and, then, as contributions of equity from P to B, from B to D and from D to F. Each step is
3European Commission (2006) reports that capital duties are levied at the rate of 0.5% in Poland and Portugal, 0.6%
in Cyprus and 1% in Greece, Spain, Austria and Luxembourg. Moreover, capital duties were abolished in Ireland in 2005
and in Belgium and Netherlands in 2006.
4Huizinga et al. (2008) report that 31 (26) out of 32 European countries in their sample grant tax credits for foreign
taxes paid on foreign source interest income when the source country is a treaty partner (non-partner). The relief for
foreign taxes provided by tax credits is only partial when when the foreign withholding tax rate exceeds the domestic
corporate tax rate and when the receiving company has no tax liabilities against which foreign taxes can be credited.
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associated with administrative costs and possibly tax costs in the form of withholding taxes on dividend
payments or capital duties on contributions of equity. A loan from E to F achieves the same end as the
chain of dividend payments and equity contributions but arguably at a lower level of administrative and
tax costs.
3 The basic model
3.1 Assumptions
The model considers two countries A and B. Each country is inhabited by a single representative agent
endowed with S units of capital and L units of labor. We adopt the standard assumptions that capital
is perfectly mobile across countries whereas labor is immobile. Both countries are small in the sense
that policy decisions have a negligible impact on the required return to capital r which is determined on
international capital markets. The representative agent is characterized by the standard utility function
U(C;X;G) where C is private consumption, X is leisure and G is public expenditure. We let L denote
labor supply and thus establish the following identity: L = X + L. Firms produce according to the
standard production function F (K;L) with constant returns to scale. There is free entry of rms, hence
rms earn zero prots in equilibrium.
Governments are benevolent and have access to two tax instruments: a tax on labor tL and a source
tax on capital tK . For expositional simplicity, we assume that taxes fall directly on production factors
and not on the income they generate. The tax base of the labor tax is thus L. The tax base of the
capital tax is K reduced by nancial liabilities and augmented by nancial assets. Since rms earn
no pure prots, the capital tax is equivalent to a standard corporate tax on prots net of labor costs
and interest expenses. Importantly, we adopt the standard assumption that governments are unable to
enforce a residence based capital tax, for instance, due to imperfect information about foreign source
income.
The main departure from the standard model of tax competition is the introduction of multinational
rms with stocks of intra-rm debt and equity. We assume that multinational rms consist of three types
of entities: the parent company, subsidiaries operating production plants (i.e. operating subsidiaries)
and subsidiaries holding nancial assets (i.e. nance subsidiaries). The nancial structure has two
distinct dimensions: the leverage of the rm as a whole and the intra-rm distribution of nancial assets
and liabilities. We let q denote the debt-asset ratio of the rm as a whole and sA and sB denote the
debt-asset ratio of operating subsidiaries in countries A and B respectively. We assume throughout
the paper that sA  q and sB  q, which imposes that operating subsidiaries are partly nanced with
internal debt. Firm allocate a fraction zA of the intra-rm debt claims to nance subsidiaries in country
A and a fraction zB to nance subsidiaries in country B where zA + zB = 1. Figure 2 illustrates the
capital structure of a multinational rm. For each unit of real capital required in a operating subsidiary
in country i, the parent company raises a fraction (1   q) as equity in international capital markets.
A fraction (1   si) is injected into operating subsidiaries as equity. The remaining fraction (si   q) is
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injected into the nance subsidiaries as equity in proportions given by zA and zB and passed on to the
operating subsidiary as loans. Finally, the operating subsidiary raises a fraction q as debt in international
capital markets. For future reference, we dene s  (sA; sB) and z  (zA; zB). The nancial structure
of a multinational rm thus characterized by the vector (q; s; z).5
The most crucial assumption embedded in this construction is that rms make use of cross-border
internal loans. Specically, it is implied that each unit of real capital in country i is nanced with a
fraction zj(si   q) of loans from a¢ liates in country j. More technically, it is an important assumption
that multinational rms based in countries A and B have identical nancial structures. A home bias
in nancial policies would change the nature of the policy game considerably.6
The remainder of the section analyzes the following two-stage game: In the rst stage, governments
set taxes so as to maximize the welfare of the representative agent while correctly anticipating behavioral
responses of rms and individuals and taking the tax rates of other countries as given. In the second
stage, the representative agents optimally choose their labor supply taking wages and the level of public
expenditure as given whereas rms hire production factors and produce. Section 3.2 characterizes labor
and capital market equilibrium in the second stage conditional on tax policies. Section 3.3 derives
conditions for optimal policies. Throughout section 3, we impose the assumption that the nancial
structure of multinational rms is xed. This simplication allows us to clearly expose the tax exporting
mechanism, which is the key insight of the paper. Section 4 shows that under relatively mild assumptions
the main result of the analysis carries over to an extended framework where the nancial structure is
chosen optimally and thus responds to changes in tax policy.
3.2 Capital and labor market equilibrium
We rst consider the prot maximization problem of the multinational rm. Since this basic version of
the model is holding the nancial structure xed, prots are simply maximized with respect to labor
and capital inputs in the two countries:
max
LA;LB ;KA;KB
 =
X
i=A;B
fF (Ki; Li)  Liwi   (r +  i)Kig
5A feature of the nancial structure that may seem peculiar is the exclusive use of nance subsidiaries for the holding of
nancial assets. While it is well-known that multinational rms rely heavily on specialized corporate vehicles for nancial
transactions, the empirical literature reviewed in section 2 showed that also parent companies are important providers of
internal loans. In an equivalent formulation of the model, parent companies in country i allocate a fraction zj of the debt
claims on operating subsidiaries to a nance subsidiary in country j and hold the remaining fraction zi itself.
6 If, for instance, rms were identical except that rms based in country i allocated a larger fraction of nancial assets
to nance subsidiaries in country i than rms based in country j, the former rms would be more protable than the
latter if tKi < t
K
j . Under the assumptions of free entry and constant returns to scale, asymmetric tax policies would thus
give rise to a market equilibrium with all rms based in the country with the lowest capital tax rate. In other words,
parent companies would constitute a perfectly mobile tax base, which would induce countries to engage in cut-throat tax
competition. Since this type of interaction reduces comparability with the standard framework and obscures the impact
of nancial linkages on optimal tax policy, which is the key innovation of the paper, we assume throughout the paper that
that rms based in countries A and B have identical nancial structures.
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where  i denotes the e¤ective tax rate on investment in country i given by:
 i = (1  si)tKi + (si   q)(zitKi + zjtKj ) (1)
The e¤ective tax rate  i gives the global tax burden associated with investment in country i given the
nancial structure (q; s; z). The rst term reects taxes at the level of the operating subsidiary falling
on the part of the investment (1  si) nanced with equity whereas the second term represents taxes at
the level of the nance subsidiaries falling on the part of the investment (si   q) nanced with internal
loans. It is useful to note already at this stage that  i depends on the capital tax rates in both countries
i and j. To highlight this property, we rewrite  i in the following way:
 i = iit
K
i + ijt
K
j
where ii is the fraction of the capital invested in country i, which is taxed in country i, and ij is the
fraction of the capital invested in country i, which is taxed in country j:
ii  (1  si) + (si   q)zi (2)
ij = (si   q)zj (3)
The fact that operating subsidiaries in country i are partly nanced with loans from nance subsidiaries
in country j thus implies that countries i and j e¤ectively share the capital tax base generated by
operating subsidiaries in country i. It should be noted that ii + ij = (1   q), which reects that
a fraction q of the capital stock is e¤ectively untaxed. This corresponds to the usual tax advantage
of external debt nancing when interest expenses are deductible from the corporate tax base and the
corresponding interest income is not e¤ectively taxed at the investor level.
We dene the capital-labor ratio k  K=L and the function f(k)  F (k; 1). Using these denitions
and the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production technology, we restate the prot
maximization problem of the rm in the following way:
max
LA;LB ;kA;kB
 =
X
i=A;B
Li ff(ki)  wi   ki(r +  i)g
The rst-order conditions for prot-maximization with respect to ki and Li read:
FOCki : f
0(ki) = r +  i (4)
FOCLi : f(ki)  wi   ki(r +  i) = 0 (5)
Equation (4) implicitly denes the optimal capital-labor ratio ki as a decreasing function of the cost of
capital r +  i and may thus be interpreted as a capital demand function. Equation (5) determines the
equilibrium wage rate wi for a given optimal capital-labor ratio k

i :
wi = f(k

i )  ki (r +  i) (6)
It is easy to see that any wage rate higher (lower) than wi would induce rms to contract (expand)
the scale of their operations innitely, hence wi is the unique wage rate compatible with equilibrium.
Equation (6) may thus be interpreted as (the inverse of) the labor demand function.
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The representative agent in country imaximizes utility by choosing the optimal labor supply given the
wage rate wi, the tax rate on labor tLi , public expenditure Gi and non-labor income rS. The rst-order
condition states:
UXi = (wi   tLi )UCi (7)
Equation (7) implicitly determines the labor supply. We impose throughout the paper that the labor
supply is positively related to the net-of-tax wage (wi   tLi ). Together (6) and (7) determine the labor
market equilibrium (wi ; L

i ). The equilibrium capital stock K

i follows directly from k

i and L

i giving
rise to the capital market equilibrium (r;Ki ).
3.3 Optimal tax policy
We now turn to the rst stage of the game and determination of optimal policy. The government in
country i maximizes U(Ci; Xi; Gi) while correctly anticipating how capital and labor market outcomes
respond to taxes. Private consumption and public expenditure are given by the following expressions:
Ci = L

i (w

i   tLi ) + Sr (8)
Gi = L

i t
L
i + iiK

i t
K
i + jiK

j t
K
i (9)
It should be noted that the last term of Gi represents a link between investment in country j and
government revenue in country i since the tax base in country i includes loans from nance subsidiaries
in country i to operating subsidiaries in country j.
Before solving the government problem, it is useful to see how the equilibrium wage rate is related
to tax policy and we therefore di¤erentiate wi with respect to tax rates t
K
i , t
K
j , t
L
i and t
L
j :
dwi =  ki (iidtKi + ijdtKj ) (10)
This equation is key to our model. Firstly, it shows that labor taxes have no bearing on the equilibrium
wage rate, hence suppliers of labor bear the full burden of labor taxes. Secondly, it shows that the
equilibrium wage rate in country i is negatively related to the capital tax rate in country j thus exposing
the channel through which tax exporting occurs in the model. Due to the intra-rm nancial linkages,
higher capital taxes in country j raises the e¤ective tax rate on capital employed in country i. The full
burden of capital taxes is shifted to suppliers of labor through a decline in the equilibrium wage rate,
hence a part of the burden of capital taxes in country j is exported to workers in country i.
To ease comparison with previous work, we rst consider the special case where sA = sB = q = 0
corresponding to the assumptions of the standard model where rms are completely equity nanced both
internally and externally. In this special case, we have ii = 1 and ji = 0, hence there are no intra-rm
nancial linkages and the scope for tax exporting is e¤ectively eliminated. Inserting (8) and (9) into the
utility function and using (10) and (7), we derive the following rst-order conditions for maximization
of U(Ci; Xi; Gi) with respect to the labor tax rate tLi and the capital tax rate t
K
i respectively:
FOCtLi : UG

1 + "Li + "
L
i k

i
tKi
tLi
)

  UC = 0 (11)
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FOCtKi : UG

1 + "Li + "
L
i k

i
tKi
tLi
+ "ki

  UC = 0 (12)
where "Li is the elasticity of the labor supply L

i with respect to the labor tax rate t
L
i and "
k
i is the
elasticity of the capital-labor ratio ki with respect to the e¤ective capital tax rate  i, which in this
special case equals tKi . It is easy to see that (11) and (12) require that "
K
i = 0, which only holds when
tKi = 0. We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When rms are fully equity-nanced both internally and externally (sA = sB = q = 0)
the optimal tax rate on capital tax is zero.
This proposition restates the result derived by Gordon (1986) as a special case where rms are fully
equity-nanced.7 It is instructive to inspect the rst-order conditions in more detail. The expressions
in curly brackets in (11) and (12) capture the inverse marginal cost of public funds for each of the two
tax instruments, that is the amount of public revenue raised with the labor tax and the capital tax
respectively for each unit of private consumption foregone. For tLi , the marginal deadweight loss has
two terms, both related to labor supply responses and thus proportional to the tax elasticity of the
labor supply. The rst term "Li represents changes in the labor tax revenue whereas the second term
"Li k

i t
K
i =t
L
i represents changes in the capital tax revenue. The latter e¤ect owes itself to the fact that
changes in the labor supply Li produce proportional changes in the capital tax base K

i for a given
capital-labor ratio ki . For t
K
i , the marginal deadweight loss has the same two terms and an additional
term "ki . The rst two terms reect that capital taxes reduce the net-of-tax wage (w

i   tLi ) by exactly
the same amount as labor taxes per dollar of revenue raised where capital taxes work through changes
in the gross wage rate wi . The third term captures the distortion of the capital-labor ratio introduced
by the capital tax. It follows directly that labor taxes raise more revenue than capital taxes per unit of
private consumption foregone and that capital taxes should therefore not be employed. In brief, capital
taxes distort the labor supply to the same extent as labor taxes and moreover distort the capital-labor
ratio of rms, hence they are inferior to labor taxes.
We now turn to the more general case where multinational rms have a xed nancial structure with
si  q  0. Inserting (8) and (9) into the utility function and using (10) and (7), it is straightforward to
show that the rst-order conditions for maximization of U(Ci; Xi; Gi) with respect to the labor tax rate
tLi and the capital tax rate t
K
i are:
FOCtLi : UG

1 + "Li + "
L
i iik

i
tKi
tLi

  UC = 0 (13)
FOCtKi : UG
(
1 + "Li + "
L
i iik

i
tKi
tLi
+ "ki ii
tKi
 i
+
ji
ii
Kj
Ki
+
2ji
ii
Kj
Ki
 
"Lj
tKi
tLj
kj + "
k
j
tKi
 j
!)
 UC = 0 (14)
7Proposition 1 may easily be generalized to any set of parameters sA = sB = q  0 where operating subsidiaries are
partly nanced with a positive fraction of external debt and zero internal debt.
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As before, the expressions in curly brackets express the inverse marginal cost of public funds. For
tLi , the marginal cost of public funds is identical to the case of fully equity-nanced rms except for the
factor ii on the last term, which reects that behavioral responses reducing the capital stock Ki (i.e.
reductions in Li or k

i ) now have a smaller revenue e¤ect since only a fraction ii of K

i is e¤ectively
taxed in country i. For tKi , the marginal cost of public funds includes the same terms as for t
L
i and four
additional terms. We consider these terms in turn: The rst term "ki iit
K
i = i is the equivalent of the last
term in (4) and captures the marginal deadweight loss associated with distortions of the capital-labor
ratio ki . The second term jiK

j =iiK

i is the tax exporting e¤ect, which reects that capital taxes in
country i are partly borne by workers in country j. Intuitively, the tax exporting e¤ect is increasing
in the foreign capital stock e¤ectively subject to domestic capital taxation jiKj and decreasing in the
domestic capital stock e¤ectively subject to domestic capital taxation iiKi . The nal two terms capture
behavioral responses in country j that erode capital tax revenues in country i. Intuitively, capital taxes
in country i raise e¤ective capital taxation in country j and thus lower the capital stock Kj , which is
partly subject to taxation in country i, through reductions in both Lj and k

j .
Equations (13) and (14) imply that an optimal tax mix in country i must satisfy the following
equation:
"ki ii
tKi
 i
+
ji
ii
Kj
Ki
+
2ji
ii
Kj
Ki
 
"Lj
tKi
tLj
kj + "
k
j
tKi
 j
!
= 0 (15)
It is easy to verify that jiKj=iiKi is positive whereas all other terms are proportional to  tKi . It
follows that only a tax vector (tKi ; t
L
i ) with t
K
i > 0 can satisfy equations (13) and (14). We summarize
this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When rms have a xed nancial structure involving some internal debt nancing (si >
q) and some diversication of nancial assets (0 < zi < 1), the optimal capital tax rate is strictly positive.
The result reported in proposition 2 is driven by tax exporting. Capital taxes in country i raise the
cost of capital in both countries i and j and part of the tax burden is therefore borne by workers in
country j through a reduction in wj . Capital taxes still have the undesirable e¤ect of distorting the
capital-labor ratio in countries i and j, however, the marginal deadweight loss is zero when evaluated at
tKi = 0. Intuitively, the marginal deadweight loss associated with an increase in t
K
i equals the marginal
revenue loss due to behavioral responses and starting from a policy vector with tKi = 0, the marginal
revenue loss caused by an erosion of the capital tax base is zero.
4 An extended model with endogenous capital structure
4.1 Further assumptions
The purpose of this section is to show that proposition 2, which was derived under the assumption of
a xed nancial structure, extends to a more realistic setting where the nancial structure responds to
changes in the tax environment. Instead of explicitly modelling the multitude of determinants of the
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optimal capital structure, we adopt the following reduced form specication: A target capital structure
(eq;es;ez) represents the optimal capital structure absent tax considerations and tax motivated deviations
from the target capital structure are associated with real costs. Firms make optimal choices in the
three dimensions of the nancial structure and thus choose: (i) q and incur a cost proportional to g(q)
where g(eq) = 0, g0(q)(q   eq)  0 and g00(q)  0 implying that costs are (weakly) convex in the distance
jq  eqj; (ii) (sA; sB) and incur costs proportional to b(si) where b(es) = 0, b0(si)(si es)  0 and b00(si)  0
implying that costs are (weakly) convex in the distance jsi esj; (iii) (zA; zB) and incur costs proportional
to h(zi) where hi(ezi) = 0, h0i(zi)(zi   ezi)  0 and h00i (zi)  0 implying that costs are (weakly) convex in
the distance jzi   ezij. Moreover, we assume that costs related to q are proportional to the total capital
stock of the rm, costs related to si are proportional to the capital stock in country i and costs related
to z are proportional to the size of intra-rm loans. These specications seem reasonable and ensure
that constant returns to scale is retained. Finally, cost functions are scaled so that costs are expressed
in units of output.
It is useful to briey lay out mechanisms that support this reduced form. Starting with q, it is a
standard presumption in the corporate nance literature that leverage is associated with non-tax costs
in terms of a higher probability of costly bankruptcy procedures and suboptimal risk-taking. This
assumption implies that eq = 0, however, we adopt a slightly more general specication by assuming thateq  0. Turning to s, it was suggested in section 2 that agency problems at the level of the operating
subsidiaries may be alleviated by debt. We thus assume that esi > eq reecting that agency problems
are su¢ ciently strong to ensure that the target leverage at the operating subsidiary level exceeds the
target leverage at the rm level. Finally, we assume that 0 < ezi < 1 implying that the target capital
structure involves some diversication of nancial assets on entities in di¤erent countries. This would be
true if the cost of capital raised in external capital markets to nance operating subsidiaries in country
i depends on the consolidated leverage of a¢ liates in country i (i.e. the asset-weighted average leverage
of operating and nance subsidiaries in country i), for instance, because foreign assets are more costly
to seize than domestic assets in the event of bankruptcy.
The structure of the game analyzed in this section closely follows the game analyzed in section 3
except that rms choose the optimal nancial structure (q; s; z) simultaneously with the optimal
capital and labor inputs. Section 4.2 characterizes the labor and capital market equilibria for given
policies whereas section 4.3 derives conditions for optimal policies.
4.2 Capital and labor market equilibrium
With the additional assumptions introduced in the previous subsection, the prot function of the multi-
national rm may be stated as follows:
 =
X
i=A;B
fF (Ki; Li)  Liwi   (r +  i)Kig
 b(sA)KA   b(sB)KB   g(q) fKA +KBg   fh(zA) + h(zB)g f(sA   q)KA + (sB   q)KBg
13
The rst line reiterates the prot function of the basic model. The second line summarizes the cost
terms associated with the debt-asset ratios at the operating subsidiary level si, the debt-asset ratio at
the rm level q and the distribution of nancial assets zi. Prots are maximized over capital and labor
inputs in each of the two operating subsidiaries as well as the ve dimensions of the nancial structure.
The prot maximization problem is solved in the Appendix. The properties of the optimal nancial
structure may be summarized as follows: (i) q > eq except when tKi = tKj = 0 in which case q = eq. These
properties derive from the tax advantage of external debt over equity, which vanishes as corporate tax
rates are approaching zero; (ii) si > esi is possible only if tKi > tKj . Intuitively, nancing the subsidiary
in country i with intra-rm debt involves some shifting of tax base from country i to country j; (iii)
zi > ezi if and only if tKi < tKj . Moreover, it is shown that changes in the optimal nancial structure is
related to changes in tax rates in the following intuitive way: zi increases with t
K
j and decreases with
tKi , q
 increases with tKi and t
K
j , and s

i increases with t
K
i and decreases with t
K
j . This implies that
multinational rms respond to a tax increase in country i by adjusting all dimensions of their nancial
structure with the aim of reducing the tax base in country i.
Utility maximization of the representative agent leads to a rst-order condition identical to (7), which
implicitly denes labor supply as a function of the net-of-tax wage rate. The prot maximization problem
gives rise to a uniquely determined equilibrium wage rate:
wi = f(k

i )  [r +  i + b(si ) + g(q) +

h(zi ) + h(z

j )
	
(si   q)]ki
Together, the labor supply function and the equilibrium wage rate dene the labor market equilibrium
(wi ; L

i ). The equilibrium capital stock K

i follows directly from k

i and L

i giving rise to the capital
market equilibrium (r;Ki ).
4.3 Optimal tax policy
Private consumption and government expenditure are given by (8) and (9) respectively with the single
qualication that ii and ji are endogenous in the present setting. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium wage
rate with respect to tLi , t
K
i and t
K
j yields an expression for dw, which is identical to (10). Intuitively,
rms respond to tax changes with adjustments in the nancial structure, however, the e¤ects of the
adjustments on prots and wages are second-order since the nancial structure is initially optimized.
This is an application of the envelope theorem.
Using the expressions for Ci, Gi and dw, we derive the following rst-order conditions for maximiza-
tion of U(Ci; Xi; Gi) with respect to tLi and t
K
i respectively:
UG

1 + "Li + "
L
i iik

i
tKi
tLi

  UC = 0 (16)
UG
(
1 + "Li + "
L
i iik

i
tKi
tLi
+ "ki ii
tKi
 i
+
ji
ii
Kj
Ki
+
2ji
ii
Kj
Ki
 
"Lj
tKi
tLj
kj + "
k
j
tKi
 j
!
+Ait
K
i
)
  UC = 0 (17)
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where
A  1
ii

dsj
dtKi
Kj
Ki
zi  
dsi
dtKi
zj +
dzi
dtKi

(si   q) +
Kj
Ki
(sj   q)

  dq

dtKi

zi (1 +
Kj
Ki
)

Whereas (16) is identical to the equivalent in the simple model, (17) has an additional term AitKi , which
represents the revenue e¤ect of the adjustments to the optimal nancial structure induced by a marginal
increase in tKi . We note that A is unambiguously negative, which derives from the fact that multinational
rms respond to tax increases in country i by adjusting all dimensions of their nancial structure in order
to reduce the tax base in country i.
It follows from (16) and (17) that the following expression needs to be satised by an optimal tax
mix (tLi ; t
K
i ).
"ki ii
tKi
 i
+
ji
ii
Kj
Ki
+
2ji
ii
Kj
Ki
 
"Lj
tKi
tLj
kj + "
k
j
tKi
 j
!
+Ait
K
i = 0
This is the equivalent of (15) and a similar argument applies: Assuming that A is bounded, all terms
except jiKj =iiK

i are proportional to  tKi , which implies that only a tax vector (tKi ; tLi ) with tKi > 0
can satisfy equations (16) and (17). It may easily be veried using the expressions for dzi, dq and dsi
derived in the Appendix that the boundedness of A is ensured if the second-order derivatives of the cost
functions h(), g() and b() are strictly positive. Essentially, strict convexity of cost functions h(), g()
and b() implies that the elasticity of all dimensions of the capital structure with respect to taxes is nite
so that marginal tax changes induce marginal behavioral responses. We summarize this analysis in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 When rms optimally choose their nancial structure, the optimal capital tax rate is
strictly positive provided that h(), g() and b() are strictly convex functions.
Intuitively, capital taxes in country i trigger adjustments of the nancial structure that erode the
capital tax base in country i, however, evaluated at tKi = 0, the marginal revenue loss - and thus the
marginal deadweight loss - associated with these responses is zero. Since the tax exporting property of
capital taxes is still at play, the optimal capital tax rate is strictly positive.
5 A crude empirical test
This section investigates the empirical relevance of the model on the basis of the following observations:
On one hand, prot maximization implies that rms should allocate less nancial assets to jurisdictions
with relatively high corporate tax rates. In a cross-country context, this suggests a negative correlation
between the amount of interest income earned by rms and the corporate tax rate where causality
goes from taxes to interest income. On the other hand, the reasoning underlying the model implies
that countries to which rms allocate relatively large amounts of interest income optimally set higher
capital tax rates. Intuitively, the tax exporting e¤ect derives from the share of the capital invested
in foreign countries that is subject to domestic taxation. This suggests a positive correlation between
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interest income earned by rms and the corporate tax rate where causality goes from interest income
to taxes.8 As a crude test of the empirical relevance of the model, we thus estimate the empirical
correlation between the interest income component of corporate prots and corporate tax rates across
countries. If the tax exporting mechanism highlighted in this paper is insignicant, we should expect
that the negative correlation deriving from the prot maximizing behavior of rms dominates. If the tax
exporting mechanism is su¢ ciently strong, we should expect that the positive correlation deriving from
governments exploiting the potential for tax exporting dominates.
We estimate the empirical correlation between the share of interest income in corporate prots and
corporate tax rates for a sample of 27 European countries using sectoral account data collected by
Eurostat, the o¢ cial statistical bureau of the European Union. An important merit of this sample
is that the common data source ensures that measures are comparable across countries. The sectoral
account data include a direct measure of gross interest income in the non-nancial corporate sector.9 As
a measure of corporate prots, we use gross operating surplus, dened as total output less the cost of
labor inputs and intermediate goods and services, in the non-nancial corporate sector.10 Finally, we use
statutory corporate tax rates combining federal and local taxes reported by ZEW (2008) as a measure
of the corporate tax level.11
Figure 3 plots corporate tax rates against the ratio of interest income to gross operating surplus
in non-nancial corporations in 2007. There is considerable cross-country variation in both variables
with the interest income component in corporate prots ranging from 0.02 (Lithuania) to 0.29 (Sweden)
and corporate tax rates ranging from 0.1 (Bulgaria and Cyprus) to 0.39 (Germany). As indicated by
the estimated trend line, the correlation between the two variables is moderately positive, which is
consistent with the hypothesis that countries exploit the tax exporting potential introduced by internal
capital markets within multinational rms. We emphasize, however, that the estimated coe¢ cients
reported in the gure should not be interpreted as an estimate of the causal e¤ect. Clearly, this simple
empirical framework su¤ers from issues of reverse causality and omitted variables that make it unsuitable
for providing reliable estimates of causal e¤ects.
8A formal derivation of this result would require an analysis of the equilibrium of an asymmetric model where ij 6= ji.
This is beyond the scope of this paper.
9 Ideally this measure would be rened to include only interest payments from foreign a¢ liates since interest income
from other sources (e.g. bank deposits and domestic a¢ liates) do not create a scope for tax exporting, however, the dataset
does not provide a decomposition on the source of the interest income.
10Arguably, net operating surplus, which excludes consumption of xed capital, would be a better measure of prots,
however, this income category is only reported by a subset of countries.
11While the statutory corporate tax rate is typically the e¤ective tax rate applying to the interest income earned by
corporations, there are exceptions to this principle: Loss-making rms face a lower e¤ective tax rate on interest income if
(i) there is imperfect carry-forward of tax losses or (ii) there is a positive probability that the rm will never make enough
prots to use the tax losses. Moreover, some countries maintain special tax regimes that reduce the e¤ective taxation of
internationally mobile nancial income.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a model of corporate taxation in the presence of nancially integrated multi-
national rms. The two key assumptions of the model - and the main departure from standard models
of international taxation - relate to the internal capital markets of multinational rms. Specically, it
was assumed that multinational rms partly nance foreign investment with internal loans and that
internal loans are not entirely driven by a prot shifting motive. The main nding is that the presence
of internal loans introduces a tax exporting motive for corporate taxes. Intuitively, to the extent that
multinational rms nance investment in country i with loans from a¢ liates in country j, the burden of
corporate taxes in the latter country partly fall on investment and thus workers in the former country.
Our model thus represents a way to resolve the tension between the standard result that the optimal
source based capital tax is zero and the casual observation that most countries employ corporate taxes
at non-negligible rates.
In general terms, the analysis suggests that drawing on the sophisticated theories of the rm developed
in recent decades may lead to important new insights in the eld of international taxation. It is striking
that most models of taxation make highly simplistic assumptions about rm behavior and largely ignore
interactions and transactions taking place within the boundaries of the rm. Embedding a more elaborate
modelling of the rm in theories of capital taxation thus appears to be a promising avenue for further
research.
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Appendix
Analogously to the simple model, we rewrite the prot function in the following way:
 =
X
i=A;B
Li ff(ki)  wi   [r +  i + b(si) + g(q) + fh(zA) + h(zB)g (si   q)] kig
Multinational rms maximize  over zi; q; si; ki and Li for i = A;B and we state the rst-order conditions
below:
FOCzi : h
0(zj)  h0(zi) = tKi   tKj (18)
FOCq: g0(q) = zitKi + zjt
K
j + h(zi) + h(zj) (19)
FOCsi : b
0(si) = (1  zi)

tKi   tKj
	  h(zi)  h(zj) (20)
FOCki : f
0(ki) = r +  i + b(si) + g(q) + fh(zA) + h(zA)g(si   q) (21)
FOCLi : f(ki)  wi   f 0(ki)ki = 0 (22)
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where it should be noted that the identity zA + zB = 1 implies that the choice (zA; zB) is e¤ectively
one-dimensional. The set of rst-order conditions can be solved sequentially: The optimal distribution of
nancial assets zA and z

B is uniquely determined by (18). Conditional on (z

A; z

B), the optimal leverage
ratio of the rm as a whole q is determined by (19) and the optimal leverage of each operating subsidiary
sA and s

B are determined by (20). Conditional on the optimal nancial structure of the rm, the optimal
capital-labor ratios kA and k

B are determined by (21). Finally, (22) determines the equilibrium wage
rate wi :
wi = f(k

i )  [r +  i + b(si ) + g(q) +

h(zi ) + h(z

j )
	
(si   q)]ki
where we have used (21). Di¤erentiating (18)-(20) and assuming interior solutions, it is easy to show
that the optimal nancial structure responds to tax changes in the following way:
dzi =
dtKj   dtKi
h00(zi ) + h00(z

j )
dq =
zi dt
K
i + z

j dt
K
j
g00(q)
dsi =
zj (dt
K
i   dtKj )
b00(si )
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Table 1: Empirical evidence on multinational firm capital structure
Buettner and Wamser (2009) Ramb and Weichenreider (2005) Desai et al (2004) Altshuler and Grubert (2003)
Data source Bundesbank Bundesbank BEA survey Interna l Revenue
Sample Foreign affiliates of German firms German affiliates of non-German firms Foreign affiliates of US firms Foreign affiliates of US firms
Year 1996-2005 2001* 1994 1996
Total debt- asset ratio 0.586 0.529 0.545 0.539
Internal debt -asset ratio 0.241 0.296  -  -
 - from parent company 0.135  - 0.085 0.110
 - from other affiliates 0.106  -  -  -
Figure 1: Debt versus equity financing with chains of ownership 
Parent (’P’)
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Subsidiary (’E’) Subsidiary (’F’)
Equity
Equity
Equity
Dividend
Dividend
Dividend
Loan
 
  
Figure 2: The capital structure of the multinational firm 
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Figure 3: A crude empirical test 
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Note: The sample consists of Switzerland, Norway and the 27 EU member states excluding Luxembourg and Malta for which data on interest income and 
gross operating surplus in the non-financial corporate sector are unavailable. 
Sources: Eurostat and Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (2008)
 
 
 
